Greetings once again. This is the current status of land doctrine paths and their Cold War successors.
Superiour Firepower - US Army doctrine-Early infantry motorization (increases fuel and supply consumption and speed of Superiour Firepower-INF to basically same level than MOT)
-Focuses on quality in training (enables only equivalent training and manpower laws unless on a dire situation - more of this later)
-Encourages limited NCO initiative from early on with more focus on small-unit tactics later (better Morale and ORG, increased Officer Demand)
-Overall emphasis of technology and quality over quantity (increased stats and supply usage to simulate the emphasis on firepower and good equipment)
-Extensive, efficient and fully motorized supply organization (supply bonuses, increased fuel consumption when compared to other doctrines)
**********COLD WAR ERA**********1950s - Long stagnation in doctrinal thinking and land warfare research in general (has the most time-consuming postwar analysis) due the increased focus on nuclear deterrence.
1960s - Seeks to increase flexibility - small bonuses for Suppression for all unit types (more for MAR, MNT and PAR), even more efficient supply system, increases the stats and prizes of units more than any other doctrine due the ever-increasing emphasis on superiour technology.
1970s - Emphasis on improving defensive stats and improving firepower
1980s - Seeks to increase the usage of NV equipment to whole new level - steep increase in prizes of MECH and ARM, significant night fighting bonuses
Grand Battle Plan - Focuses on artillery-based firepower, defensive infantry warfare and fixed fortifications, all led by a centralized command system.-Training and manpower-wise this doctrine is quite versatile, enabling more alternatives between longer and shorter training systems and between professional volunteer armies and draft-based systems.
-Strong and heavy artillery: ART gains increased attack stats, fort attack and supply consumption while loses speed
-Limits and discourages NCO initiative, emphasizes central command: long command delays due the cumbersome command structure - relatively high Org but low Morale due the limited capabilities to deal with unexpected setbacks and quick situations
-Infantry starts with stats emphasizing defense
-Mid-war reforms towards combined arms focus and more offensive mindset, continues to rely heavily on ART
-Second-best supply system after Superiour Firepower
**********COLD WAR ERA**********1950s -Relatively quick postwar analysis that brings wide benefits for operational thinking - Grand Battle Plan loses much of the earlier disadvantages compared to other doctrine paths. Starts to specialize the army into three missions - homeland defense, conventional land warfare and COIN warfare. Initially bonuses for supply systems due increased standardization and increases for Suppression values for all units (allready has one of the highest Suppression values to begin with since this is doctrine for old colonial powers, France and Britain) - ART starts to lose its earlier significance quite fast.
1960s - Specialization continues: GAR gains speed and defensive stats to represent reservist infantry used as massed homeland defense force, MAR, MNT and PAR specialize further on COIN warfare while MECH and ARM gain more stats (and prize) - stats-wise INF and MOT are jack-of-all-trades. The relative decline of ART continues.
1970s - Increased professionalization and reliance on technology (better stats, higher prizes), starts to mimic Superiour Firepower in the emphasis on quality over quantity. - By now the earlierly really strong Grand Battle Plan ART is among the weakest of all tech trees.
1980s - ART gains a stats boost and is now again average when compared to Superiour Firepower, Large Front and Spearhead. Earlier focus on professionalism and technology continues, bringing units stats-wise roughly on par with their Superiour Firepower equivalents.
Spearhead - German combined arms-warfare, weak point of this doctrine is the old-fashioned supply system that is always hard-pressed to keep up with the armored spearheads-Early combined arms specialty and armor concentration - lower frontage to armored units and relatively high bonuses from combined arms during first war years
-Offensively trained and equipped infantry (increased Fort and River attacks and offensive stats, other doctrines will gain similar bonuses after mid-war reforms)
-Increased combat movement speed and decreased command delays to represent focus on quick breakthroughs and manouvre warfare
-Strongly encourages NCO initiative: high Org and Morale but also higher Officer demand.
-Starts with strong emphasis on quality and long training schemes, but can and will lower them if seriously threatened just like all other doctrine paths (see the end of post)
-Will continue to rely on horse-drawn artillery and supply system: weakest WWII-era supply system of all "major" doctrine paths.
**********COLD WAR ERA**********1950s - Relatively fast postwar analysis - brings little benefits as the doctrinal approach adopted late during WWII is essentially retained as it is and the earlier superiourity in land combat doctrines is in essense lost due the improving stats of other major doctrine paths.
-Focuses on small-unit combined arms tactics with emphasis on armoured warfare and increased anti-air
-Bonuses for the earlierly poor supply system, increased fuel demands.
-MECH and ARM gain most stats-benefits, INF and GAR are modernized into regular mass reservist units with new emphasis on Suppression (earlier experiences from anti-partisan warfare are applied on training and tactics)
1960s - Focus on MECH and ARM and manouver warfare is retained: new emphasis on operational surprise in the form of advanced encryption and new radio communications protocols - seeks to lower Visibility of most units. The qualitative difference between increasingly professional quick reaction forces and regular mass army increases (different unit types and prizes)
1970s and 1980s - Follows the general trend of increasing unit prizes due advanced technology - the qualitative gap between the rank-and-file INF and GAR and professinal elite formations keeps growing.
Large Front - Deep Battle Doctrine that emphasizes movement and focused use of units on a key parts of the battlefield to achieve breakthrough - theoretically brilliant doctrine that has some serious drawbacks-Early focus on combined arms-warfare (especially ART) and movement speed
-Massive breakthrough assaults: INF, MOT and CAV units of this doctrine have the lowest frontage of all major doctrines, enabling them to amass large forces on a narrow front to achieve breakthrough by overwhelming numbers. Naturally focusing men and material in such manner will increase casualties, so Max. Attrition and defensiveness of early war stats of this doctrine will be adjusted so that such warfare will be accordingly bloody and cause much more casualties than any other major doctrine of the same period. This penalty will gradually decline.
-Relatively low Organization but really high Morale, enabling the units of these doctrines to sustain significant casualties and still quickly regain their cohesion
-Training and recruitment-wise this doctrine clearly support quantity over quality.
**********COLD WAR ERA**********1950s - One of the quickest postwar analyses - takes the approach that land warfare will have to be studied further despite the appearance of nuclear weapons.
-Focuses on infantry motorization, bringing their INF to same speed level and fuel comsumption than Superiour Firepower.
-Will retain part of the massed attack approach used earlier (still lower frontages and higher casualties than in Spearhead, Grand Battle Plan or Superiour Firepower)
-Initial focus on ARM, and ART, while GAR gains increased Suppression
1960s- New focus on stats of MECH and SP-ART and SP-R.ART as well as mobility (ENG and all other unit types gain more river attack)
1970s - Further emphasis on indirect fire, at this stage the best stats for all units of this type (compensated by increased supply consumption to simulate the massive prep. barrages used in this doctrine)
-Increasing focus on AA capabilities and operational and tactical surprise - Visibility of all units
-Starts to promote more NV equipment than earlier to bring the doctrine to same level as Superiour Firepower, Spearhead and Grand Battle Plan
1980s - Continues along the trends set in 1970s.
Light Infantry: Doctrine that seeks to utilize difficult terrain, tactical mobility and low-level initiative-Starts as a combination of Spearhead-type good org and morale and relatively short command delay and a lighter version of Grand Battle Plan defensive infantry - plain stats-wise Light Infantry INF and other units are indeed equipped with fewer heavy weapons and thus worse than their counterparts in Superiour Firepower, Spearhead, Grand Battle Plan and Large Front
-Training schemes vary, but generally this doctrine uses large-scale conscription
-Supply-wise this doctrine relies almost completely on Great War-styled "railroads and horses" approach, and is even worse than the supply system of Spearhead - this is not such a great hindrance for most minors that use this and fight on their national soil, but the Japanese conquest of China shall surely be affected.
-Combined arms-bonuses are taken into full effect only in late WWII-reforms, as the emphasis is clearly on light infantry and tanks are only a minor supporting arm at best.
**********COLD WAR ERA**********-1950s: The postwar reforms bring more emphasis on previously weak combined arms approach to warfare and to the previously poor supply system. The equipment situation is also slowly improved.
1960s: New emphasis on infantry motorization finally turns Light Infantry MOT into truly motorized formations and also increases the speed of regular INF as well. Suppression values increase as well.
1970s: Doctrine of collective defense - emphasis turns on defense, and the relative increase of offensive stats is rather low when compared to other doctrines in this era. In an approach used by Yugoslavia, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Finland the regular GAR and INF are transformed into a massive reservist armies whose sole aim is to make the possible conflict as time-consuming and costly as possible, so that any reasonable potential attacker will make a cost-benefit analysis and leave the country in question alone. Night-vision equipment
1980s: Increased emphasis on counter-attack capabilities: MECH and ARM are finally given a boost and other units gain more offensive capabilities as well.
Guerrilla Warfare: Paramilitary armies of Chinese warlords, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and later on other poor 3rd World countries, the Guerrilla Warfare starts as the worst doctrine in the tech tree, slowly developing into slightly more successfull modern guerrilla warfare.-Only doctrine that enables the construction of militia from the start
-Some users of this doctrine may not even build anything better than INF and GAR in addition to MIL (event disabling construction of better units until certain reforms)
-Really short training schemes, similar but even larger casualty penalty than Large Front to simulate the usage of manpower in order to fight despite the inadequate weaponry. Poor Organization but generally really high morale.
-Primitive supply system - but also the lowest supply demand of all doctrines in WWII-era. Hills and mountains of China can finally be filled with myriads of poorly armed militiamen without ahistorically high Chinese IC.
-Worst offensive stats and stats overall: the only exception is frontage
-Minimal Officer demand and bonus for manpower growth due the almost non-existent standards for new recruits
-Capable for defensive combat in difficult terrain
-Systematic camouflage and general lack of radios - one of the lowest Visibility ratings of all doctrines
-Really poor anti-tank and AA capabilities of regular units despite slight improvement during WWII.
-Starts as the poorest doctrine but WWII-era reforms keep it from becoming a complete pushover.
**********COLD WAR ERA**********1950s: Postwar analysis is quick and easy, and brings more organization and training along with better weaponry, most importantly in the form of new, simple short-range infantry AT-weapons that finally give the poor armies using Guerrilla Warfare doctrine at least some real HA punch.
1960s: Increased terrain utilization (and even lower Visibility) and manpower combined with rising National Unity boosts allow countries using guerrilla warfare to pin more modern opponents into bloody and long wars where their resilience for prolonged conflict is a bonus.
1970s: Slowly improving training systems (Org and Morale) and equipment (stats), but otherwise the doctrine continues to follow the successful outlines set in 1960s.
1980s: As above.
**Final thoughs**The more I think of it (and the more "All Militia" AARs I see
), the more it seems that for developed nations militia should be a real last-ditch option. Could we activate it by an event for doctrines that won´t otherwise use it? Please comment and contribute if you think that something I proposed is simply wrong and/or you have ideas how to do things differently.
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